Last week I was interviewed by journalist Sidonia Bogdan, special reporter of the Romanian newspaper Libertatea. Below is an English translation of the interview, which touches upon Euroscepticism, populist parties, human rights, security and (labour) migration.
Although Romania has been an EU member state for almost 20 years, it is rare to try to understand the problems of Romanian society through a comparative magnifying glass with those of another European society. How much does the Romanian Eurosceptic current differ from one in a Western European state? Are there, for example, similarities between Romanians and the Dutch or even lessons to be learned from each society? Libertatea conducted an interview with Dutch journalist Frank Elbers, who has been living and working in Romania for eight years.
Elbers is a freelance journalist and political analyst, specialising in South-Eastern Europe, with a focus on Romania, Bulgaria and Moldova. He is a correspondent for several media outlets in the Netherlands and Belgium, such as De Groene Amsterdammer, BNR Nieuwsradio, NPO Radio 1 and VRT Radio 1. He is currently an associate researcher at the Research Institute of the University of Bucharest (ICUB), Division of Social Sciences, where he leads research projects on gender and politics, as well as civil society organisations in the Black Sea region. Between 2016 and 2018, he was a Beirut correspondent and a visiting researcher at the Institute for Feminist Studies in the Arab World of the Lebanese American University, where he taught courses on gender and human rights.
Comparative European studies typically compare two or more countries from the same region. The logic is sound: these countries are thought to share certain similarities in history and development patterns. However, the EU has 27 member states, so it could be productive to try a different type of comparison. How about comparing Romanian and Dutch society’s perceptions of the EU? Could this spark an intriguing debate?
A comparison between Romania and the Netherlands actually makes quite sense. Both countries have around 18, 19 million inhabitants. Although the Dutch economy is twice as large in terms of GDP, both the Netherlands and Romania have been experiencing major labour shortages, which has attracted migrant workers on a large scale. Both countries have a strong Transatlantic orientation when it comes to defence and security. Both are “middle powers” in international affairs. Populations in both Romania and the Netherlands are strong proponents of the European Union. A big difference is that the Netherlands are a net contributor and Romania a net receiver of European funds, which is occasionally reflected in perceptions of the EU — ranging from Euro-enthusiasm, Euro-pragmatism to Euro-scepticism. There are many linkages between both countries — from large-scale investment to labour migrants and so-called “knowledge migrants”. Yet there is limited knowledge about each other whereas I think both countries could learn from each other.
What are the root causes of Euroscepticism in Romanian society? What observations have you made all over your stay in Romania?
In fact, Romanians historically maintain high levels of trust in the EU, often above the European average, viewing the union favourably compared to national institutions, according to Eurobarometer data. However, recent trends show growing, albeit minority, Eurosceptic sentiment driven by opposition parties, economic concerns, and disillusionment. Despite occasional declines, Romania is often characterised by Euro-enthusiasm, viewing the EU as a counterweight to domestic political inefficiencies. As you know, Romanians frequently express higher confidence in EU institutions than in their own national government, which is often associated with corruption. Support for the EU is often rooted in tangible benefits such as freedom of movement and worker rights, rather than ideological alignment, which can lead to rapid shifts in perception based on economic conditions. In my experience, Romanians are rather pragmatic. There are few highways, towns, parks, and blocs around the country where you won’t see signs that renovations and improvements have been made with EU funding!
Is there Euroscepticism among the Dutch? How does it express itself, and what could be the causes?
While the Netherlands has historically been a strong proponent of European integration, it has recently displayed rising Eurosceptic sentiment, often described more accurately as “euro-pragmatism” or selective skepticism rather than a general desire to leave the union. This sentiment is strongly driven by anti-immigrant parties, most notably the PVV (Party for Freedom) lead by Geert Wilders, which advocates for a “Nexit” and is the driving force behind the current anti-EU discourse. Dutch Euroscepticism is fueled by concerns over high net contributions to the EU budget and the impact of (potential) EU enlargement. Despite the rise of these Eurosceptic parties, a high percentage of Dutch citizens consider their country’s EU membership to be a “good thing” (81% in fall 2025).
What are the biggest security dangers to Dutch society? How does the Netherlands approach the Russian threat?
I tend to define “security” rather broadly. As a country situated in a delta and of which half of its surface is below sea level, global warming and rising sea levels are undoubtedly the biggest threat. Energy dependence is another, potential, danger. The Netherlands effectively closed the gas field in Groningen — Europe’s largest natural gas field that accounted for 90% of the gas supplied to Dutch households, and main pillar of the Dutch welfare state — in 2023 due to (minor) earthquake risks. Now it needs to import energy: oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG), coal and electricity. Despite its high potential (especially wind energy), renewable energy is not yet a substantial part of the energy mix (49% of total electricity production in 2025). Incredibly, the Netherlands still imports gas (mainly LNG) from Russia (1% of total energy supply in 2025). Yet Russia is perceived as the main threat to Dutch security. Dutch intelligence services are wary of cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns and sabotage. Russia is believed to have been behind cyber attacks and active preparations to sabotage vital infrastructure on Dutch soil. NATO has traditionally been the most important security alliance for the Netherlands against foreign threats. Dutch authorities are increasing defence expenditures to the new NATO norm of 5%. The Netherlands is one of the major providers of military aid to Ukraine in its war against Russia.
What does it mean to be a populist party in the Netherlands and Romania? What are the similarities and differences?
I am not a big fan of the concept of “populist party” as, in my opinion, it assumes more similarities among rather different opposition, ultra-conservative, anti-system or anti-democratic parties than there actually are and at the same time conceals important differences. This becomes quite clear if one looks at the European Parliament. These so-called “populist” parties are organised in no less than three political fractions: Patriots for Europe; European Conservatives en Reformers; and Europe of Sovereign Nations. Political scientist Cas Mudde defines populism as a “thin-centred ideology” that divides society into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps: “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”. It argues that politics should express the will of the people. Using that definition some parties fit this profile, others don’t.
AUR occupied the political space for a (extreme) nationalist vote that had been vacant since Vadim Tudor’s Romania Mare disappeared from parliament in 2010. AUR was the only party that campaigned in the streets during the corona pandemic and the only party that opposed vaccination and anti-corona measures. Since then they have been the most visible opposition against the “political class” in Bucharest that mismanaged Romania in the past years and is currently holding the Romanian polity hostage. (One can argue that SOS România and POT are clearly radical right parties.)
Contrary to the Romania, the Dutch political system is an extremely representative parliamentary democracy: it is possible to get a seat in parliament with just 0.7% of the popular vote. Currently the 150-member parliament has MPs of 16 parties. One can argue that this system has managed to absorb all kinds of discontent since the end of World War Two — from an anti-system communist party to anti-immigrant parties — while being dominated by the three big “people’s parties”: labour, christian democrats, and liberals. Since the 1990s support for the big three has been eroding. In November 2023 for the first time the anti-immigrant and anti-islam PVV of Geert Wilders won the elections and joined a four-party coalition government. That government did not survive past a year and the Netherlands are now picking up the pieces. The PVV party has only one member: Geert Wilders himself; hardly the symbol of a political mass movement with staying power. At the same time a PVV rival, “Forum for Democracy” (FvD), was successful in recent local elections and is now represented in some municipal councils by people that have links with the extreme right and the neo-fascist milieu of minuscule groups that honour the Nazi-regime and celebrate Hitler’s birthday — something unthinkable even twenty years ago.
Having said that, I would like to point out that both countries have been, and still are, very welcoming to Ukrainian refugees. After the Russian invasion in February 2022 both countries received around 150,000 seeking refuge from the war. (After four years, the number of Ukrainians with temporary protection status went down to 135,000 in the Netherlands and up to 200,000 in Romania.) None of the political parties have made the return of Ukrainians a part of their campaigns, unlike in Poland, for example.
What shortcomings does Romania still have when it comes to respecting human rights? What are the most significant issues in this regard?
Let me emphasise first that few EU member states consistently respect, protect and promote all human rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights. When it comes to Romania I see three main issues. First, the prominence of child trafficking; Romania continues to be a main hub of human trafficking, particularly of vulnerable children, and is a “Tier 2” country in the U.S. State Department’s 2025 Trafficking in Persons Report. The second significant human rights issue is increasing (or at least better reporting of) domestic violence. And, third, the status of so-called “closed institutions” — from prisons and psychiatric hospitals to care facilities for persons with disabilities and the elderly. We all remember the “azilele groazei” scandal in 2023.
Another challenge is the implementation of rulings by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg. Although Romania has shown significant progress in implementing ECHR rulings, much work still needs to be done. Despite a ruling by the Strasbourg court (Buhuceanu and Others v. Romania) authorities have still not implemented legislation to recognise same-sex civil unions. In 2025 there were also 300 cases pending regarding property restitution.
What lessons may Romanian society learn from the Dutch, and vice versa?
That’s a difficult question. Let me focus on an issue that seems to be on many people’s mind in Europe: labour migration. The nature of migration is that many migrants tend to stay in their new host country the longer they live and work there. Romania’s policy on national minorities is built on a solid legal framework that guarantees individual rights, cultural preservation, and political representation for recognised minority groups. It emphasises intercultural dialogue, providing funding for cultural projects, mother-tongue education and language rights. I think this can serve as an example for the Netherlands where governments realised too late that the many migrant workers from in particularly Morocco and Turkey, which helped contributed majorly to industrial growth in the 1960s and 1970s, eventually created families and made the Netherlands their home. (The same is happening in the Netherlands with the thousands of refugees that fled Syria during the civil war from 2012-2024). They became de facto national minorities without successive governments undertaking appropriate policies aimed at integrating these (by now) immigrants. The strong anti-islamic sentiments since the September 11 attacks and subsequent islamist terrorist attacks in Europe — which also facilitated the rise of radical anti-immigrant parties like Geert Wilders’ PVV — resulted in large groups of Dutch citizens of Moroccan and Turkish descent being marginalised and harassed. Vice versa, Romania should realise the importance of early on integrating labour migrants from Southeast Asia — particularly Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam — who work in Romanian agriculture, construction, horeca and manufacturing. Without pro-active policies by municipalities and the national government regarding housing, labour protection, language training and integration these groups may end up continuously living on the margins of Romania society.
